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1 Introduction
This paper studies the valuation of fiat money in an endowment economy with
specialization, costly barter, and imperfect enforcement of private promises. The
environment features symmetric, competitive, and indefinitely-lived households
and allows for a finite number of Markovian state variables. Money is part of
a payment system allowing transfers of intrinsically useless net worth between
non-negative accounts subject to a fixed time lag. Monetary policy of the issuing
authority is designed in terms of sequences of nominal interest rates and heli-
copter drops of new net worth in relation to nominal income.1 Implementation of
monetary policy involves paying the transfers and setting the aggregate supply of
non-transferable risk-free bonds. The households are not forced to use money, but
optimally decide to demand it from the market for goods if only monetary policy
satisfies certain conditions defining a responsible policy, under which the interest
rate remains low and existing net worth is not diluted too quickly. The analysis
is carried under the assumption that the households are rational and have full
information about the environment and monetary policy.2
Methodologically, the paper generalizes the asset-pricing framework of Lucas
(1978) to make it applicable to fiat money without relying on modeling shortcuts
such as money-in-utility-function or cash-in-advance constraints. This way, the
model is able to credibly explain both the function of money in actual economies,
and the reasons for which money is valued, since the incentives of its users are not
distorted. The main technical contribution is an equilibrium selection mechanism
able to rule out the hypothetical possibility that money might become worthless
1This interpretation depends on equilibrium. In the paper, monetary policy is
formulated in abstract terms before it is established that money is valued.
2The authority might be called government, but the author prefers to think of a
centrally coordinated banking system issuing money used in electronic payments
(an idealization), or a monopoly central bank issuing a digital currency under
the 100%-reserve requirement. Accordingly, the bonds are not issued by a fiscal
authority, which is not part of the model. The latter dimension of monetary
policy can be interpreted either as a flow of dividends from the authority, or (with
symmetric households) money-financed universal basic income.
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due to self-fulfilling expectations, independently of monetary policy. The mecha-
nism is motivated economically by the postulate that rational households should
always invest in more money at the margin if monetary policy is responsible, and
yet the market value of money is zero, treating such situation as an arbitrage
opportunity. The generalized definition of equilibrium rules out this form of arbi-
trage and reduces to the standard definition in models without frictions, or when
money could not be valuable for other reasons, for example, due to a poorly de-
signed monetary policy. The new definition selects a unique equilibrium whenever
monetary policy is responsible, and the paper offers a general way to construct
such equilibria. Since money is valued in the unique equilibrium although it is
dominated as a store of value, the paper solves the long-standing theoretical puz-
zle known as the Hahn problem (Hahn, 1965, 1983; Hellwig, 1993), and successfully
integrates the theory of money with asset pricing.3
The model allows for stochastic endowment growth and random shocks to mone-
tary policy. Under a responsible policy, all trade is intermediated by money while
barter and Arrow-Debreu forward markets are inactive. Competitive equilibria in
the original sense of Lucas (1978), characterized by stable self-confirming expec-
tations, are called pre-equilibria. Under a responsible policy, there is exactly one
pre-equilibrium with a strictly positive value of money, which coincides with the
unique equilibrium. The equilibrium value of money is determined by nominal
spending since at low interest rates all endowment is sold in the market. Optimal
spending is determined by expectations of lifetime income, including transfers of
new net worth from the authority. If the nominal interest rate is set low (high)
relative to the rate of transfers, households optimally borrow from the authority
3The generalized definition of equilibrium is consistent with the principle of
individual rationality of competitive households and removes a form of irrational
behavior towards money implicitly imposed by the standard definition, which is
sufficient (only) in the context of frictionless models. The equilibrium selection
mechanism proposed here is quite different from either that assumed in the fis-
cal theory of the price level (FTPL) or new-Keynesian models (see the literature
overview, section 5.4), with potentially important consequences for choosing be-
tween these theories by applying the Occam razor.
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(save) and equilibrium inflation is relatively low (high) as future transfers are used
to repay debts (future interest payments on bonds are used to increase spending).
The uniqueness of equilibrium price level is the consequence of saddle-path dynam-
ics characterizing the accumulation of net worth. If spending is too high, this must
ultimately violate the non-negativity restriction imposed on the net worth by the
authority and hence is unsustainable. If spending is too low, over-accumulation
of net worth must occur, which is not optimal.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the environment and
formulates the model. Section 3 defines equilibrium and motivates the proposed
equilibrium selection mechanism. Section 4 constructs the pre-equilibrium with
positive value of money and proves that it coincides with the unique equilibrium.
Section 5 further discusses the equilibrium selection mechanism, some properties
of the equilibrium, and the existing literature. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Timing and Information
Time is divided into periods represented by half-open intervals [t, t + 1). Deci-
sions are made at t, after observing information up to and including t. No new
information arrives within (t, t+ 1).
Assumption 1 The only state variables are (Zt, et, ut, st) ∈ R+ ×R+ × U × S,
where U = Rm−2, m ≥ 2, and S ⊂ Rn is compact.5 There is a function F : S ×
S → [0, 1] such that st is a stationary ergodic Markov process with cumulative
transition density F (s, s′) = Pr(st+1 ≤ s
′|st = s), and stationary distribution Φ.
4Chaotic dynamics are ruled out as well. This logic is analogous to the me-
chanics of capital accumulation in the Ramsey model (for example, see Blanchard
and Fischer, 1989, ch. 2). The saddle-path stability used to be imposed ad-hoc
(Brock, 1974), but this practice was challenged (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1983) and
now is often considered invalid in the context of monetary models. The present
paper argues that this conclusion is incorrect.
5R+ will denote the set of strictly positive real numbers.
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There is a jointly continuous function G : R+ ×R+ ×U ×S×S → R+ ×R+ ×U
such that
(Zt+1, et+1, ut+1) = G(Zt, et, ut, st, st+1). (1)
This assumption guarantees that the environment is Markovian, and all informa-
tion is represented by a finite number of state variables. The economic interpre-
tation of the state variables is postponed to later.6
The next assumption, preceded by a definition, guarantees that expectations can
be represented by continuous functions.7
Definition 1 Consider the space F of functions f : D → R, with D a Cartesian
product of k subsets of the real line, including one copy of R+, with corresponding
argument denoted by e. Fix ϕ(x1, . . . , e, . . . , xk) ∈ F as ϕ(e) = e
1−γ/(1 − γ),
γ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞), or ϕ(e) = log e. For any function g ∈ F , define the norm
‖g‖ϕ = supx∈D |g(x1, . . . , e, . . . , xk)/ϕ(e)|. Any function g ∈ Z with the property
‖g‖ϕ < ∞ will be referred to as ϕ-bounded.
8
Assumption 2 For every ϕ-bounded and jointly continuous function f(x, e, s, s′)
(with x a vector of state variables defined on a Cartesian product of subsets of the
real line), the function (Tf)(x, e, s) ≡
∫
S
f(x, e, s, s′)dF (s, s′) is jointly continuous.
2.2 Consumers and Preferences
There is a large finite number of symmetric, indefinitely-lived households receiving
exogenous perishable endowment which can either be consumed or given to a mem-
ber of another household. All variables are in per-household terms. Households
6This assumption can be seen as a restriction on the environment imposed by
Nature. It is consistent with the assumption of a finite number of agents (see
below), none of which being capable of generating information exceeding a fixed
finite number of Markovian dimensions.
7Again, this can be seen as a property of the environment.
8Intuitively, a ϕ-bounded function does not grow (or fall) faster than ϕ(e)
in any direction of its domain, asymptotically. The definition and naming are
standard (Altug and Labadie, 2008, ch. 8).
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occupy distinct physical locations, and the distance between any two locations is
normalized to one. A household is composed of a producer who stays at home,
and a consumer who can travel, carry goods, and consume at any location.









where 0 < β < 1, u(c) = c1−γ/(1− γ) if γ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞), or u(c) = log(c).
Endowment evolves according to
et+1 = et λ(st, st+1), (3)
where λ : S×S → R+ is a continuous function valued in a compact set of positive
numbers containing 1 in the interior.
Assumption 3 The function λ(s, s′) satisfies w(s) ≡ β
∫
S
λ(s, s′)1−γdF (s, s′) <
1, all s ∈ S.
This assumption guarantees that the consumption-based value of the whole econ-
omy is finite. For future reference, note that it is possible to pick w̄ < 1 such that
maxs w(s) < w̄.
2.3 Frictions
The following three assumptions summarize the properties of the environment
which can be interpreted as representing specialization, costs of barter, and im-
perfect enforcement of private contracts, respectively.
Assumption 4 Consuming own endowment is inefficient, and subject to a pro-
portional waste of κs ∈ (0, 1]. Consumption of endowment obtained from any other
household is efficient.
Assumption 5 Carrying endowment involves a proportional waste of κp ∈ (0, 1]
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of the carried good.
Assumption 6 Households can offer private promises to members of other house-
holds, but a household accepting such promise loses κe ∈ (0, 1] of the discounted
present value of the promised flow, under the household’s consumption-based
stochastic discount factor.
The next assumption is only for convenience, since it allows to ignore barter and
private promises in the analysis by making them too costly to ever be attempted.9
Assumption 7 The cost parameters of assumptions (4)-(6) satisfy
κ ≡ min{κs, κp, κe} = κs.
2.4 Net Worth
There is a single generic institutional authority that does not consume but has
well-defined incentives that can be represented by time-invariant rules. Actions of
the authority are independent of any subset of households. The authority possesses
sufficient power to set up all components of the environment introduced below and
to secure its monopoly position.
Initially, the authority assigns a non-negative account to each household with net
worth W0 > 0, measured in units called dollars. At t, Wt is interpreted as end-
of-period net worth carried from t − 1, and is augmented by Gt ≥ 0 to yield
beginning-of-period net worth
Ht = Wt +Gt. (4)
Accounts can be accessed from any location and used to make transfers to other
households, using a pre-existing payment system controlled by the authority. A
9This does not affect any of the main conclusions of the paper.
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transfer can immediately be verified by the recipient but requires a fixed time lag
to be completed. For convenience, the frequency of the model is chosen to match
that lag. Irrespective of whether households use their accounts, one can define
Mt ≥ 0, Yt ≥ 0 (5)
as transfers to other households made at t, and transfers on the way from other
households expected to arrive at the beginning of t+ 1, respectively.
A household can lend nominal funds to the authority, and the realized demand for
lending is represented by Bt bonds of unit dollar face value (negative Bt represents
borrowing), which can neither be transferred nor carried. The bonds are sold at
discount Qt, set by the authority, and are repaid at the end of the period.
The payment system only processes transfers satisfying
Ht ≥ Mt +BtQt, (6)
which is referred to as the budget constraint.
The end-of-period net worth evolves according to
Wt+1 = Ht −Mt + Yt +Bt(1−Qt), (7)
which implies
Ht+1 = Ht −Mt + Yt +Bt(1−Qt) +Gt+1. (8)
If a household borrows from the authority, this is subject to
Wt+1 ≥ 0, (9)
which defines Ht −Mt − BtQt + Yt as maximal collateral.
10
10Inequality (9) can be seen as implementing the classic collateral constraint of
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In effect, it must be true in every period that
Wt ≥ 0. (10)
2.5 Markets and Prices
Consumers can freely travel across locations with portable accounts. Since it is
technologically possible to exchange money transfers for endowment in a quid-
pro-quo fashion, one can assume that there exists a competitive market price
(1/P )t ≥ 0 of a dollar of transferred funds in terms of goods.
11
Given this price Yt is a choice variable restricted by
(1/P )tYt ≤ et. (11)
The choices of Mt and Yt imply that a household enjoys consumption of
ct = (1/P )tMt + (1− κ) [et − (1/P )tYt] . (12)
Since Mt and Yt are the same in the aggregate, symmetry between the households
requires
Mt = Yt, (13)
which will be called the Keynes law, and imposed as an equilibrium condition.12
Bagehot (1873), and justifies calling Wt net worth.
11If (1/P )t > 0, one can define the price level Pt = 1/(1/P )t.
12While this condition must hold identically (spending generates income), indi-
vidual households believe that they can choose Mt and Yt independently.
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2.6 Monetary Policy
Let Zt > 0 denote aggregate end-of-period net worth, defined recursively via
Zt+1 = Zt +Gt +Bt (1−Qt) , (14)
Symmetry between the households requires
Wt = Zt, (15)
although the households consider them distinct.
Observation 1 By (14), the value of Zt+1 is pre-determined at t.
Monetary policy is designed in terms of two processes qt, gt. Since monetary policy
must be defined independently of equilibrium, the processes qt, gt are abstract at
this point, but in equilibrium will correspond to the nominal risk-free discount fac-
tor, and the rate of new net worth creation relative to nominal income, respectively.
The authority chooses two continuous and bounded functions q : S → (0, 1] and
g : S → [0,∞), referred to as the design functions, and sets qt = q(st), gt = g(st).
Assumption 8 The design functions satisfy 1−q(s)−g(s) ≥ 0, all s ∈ S. There
is S ′ ⊂ S with φ(S ′) > 1, and 1− q(s)− g(s) > 0, all s ∈ S ′.
Assumption 9 The function q(s) satisfies q(s) > 1− κ, all s ∈ S.
A monetary policy obeying these two assumptions is called responsible. In equilib-
rium, these assumptions will guarantee that the nominal interest rate will remain
sufficiently high relative to rate of new net worth creation, and sufficiently low
compared to the inefficiency of consuming own endowment.13
Monetary policy is implemented as follows. First, given the design functions q(s)
and g(s) satisfying assumptions 8 and 9, one constructs a new function τ : S → R.
13The nominal interest rate is related to the discount factor via q = i/(1 + i).
A responsible monetary policy allows i = 0 for finite (with probability one) times.
10
Let B be the set of bounded continuous functions on S. For f ∈ B, define operator
(Af)(s) = 1 − q(s) − g(s) + β
∫
S
λ(s, s′)1−γf(s′)dF (s, s′). Under assumption 3,
A is a contraction mapping, so there is unique τ ∈ B such that Aτ = τ (by
the Banach fixed point theorem). Under assumption 8, the fixed point satisfies
τ(s) > 0, all s ∈ S. Also, define h(s) ≡ τ(s) + g(s), which is a strictly positive
function satisfying14
h(s) > 1− q(s). (16)
Given these functions, the authority transfers
Gt = χ(st)Zt, (17)










The bonds are sold at the discount Qt = qt.
15
It makes little sense to impose Bt = B
s
t as the market-clearing condition before
establishing that money is actually valued.16 For this reason a weaker condition









[x, 0] if x ≤ 0,
[0, x] if x ≥ 0,
14The strict positivity of h(s) follows from the definition of A, strict positivity
of τ(s), and the definition of q(s).
15The implementation of monetary policy requires predicting the households’
optimal response to that policy, which is encoded in functions τ and h. The
postulated implementation rules guarantee that the processes qt and gt will indeed
possess their desired interpretation in equilibrium, while at the same time the
households will find it optimal to purchase the whole supply of bonds.
16Households may refuse to purchase the whole supply of bonds, especially when
(1/P )t = 0, without violating any constraint of the environment.
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and restrict the demand for bonds realized by a representative household to
Bt ∈ [{B
s
t , 0}]. (20)
A household can never end up holding more bonds than is actually supplied, in
absolute-value terms.
Proposition 1 Under assumption 8, monetary policy implemented by (17) and
(19) has the property that Zt > 0 implies Zt+1 > 0.
Proof. To prove the claim for Bt = B
s
t , substitute (17) and (19) into (14), and
use the definition of the function τ(s). The claim is true for Bt = 0, since g(s) ≥ 0.
Since (14) is linear in Bt, the claim is valid for all Bt ∈ [{B
s
t , 0}].
Letting Z0 > 0 be the initial aggregate net worth, proposition 1 provides a re-
cursive justification for Zt > 0, which would otherwise need to be imposed as
sequence of assumptions.
As corollary of proposition 1 and (15), Zt > 0 is sufficient to guarantee that the
end-of-period net worth of a representative household is strictly positive,
Wt+1 > 0. (21)
Intuitively, the net supply of risk-free bonds is engineered by the authority in
a way that repayment of debt (if households are borrowers) never exhausts the
end-of-period net worth. Since Gt+1 ≥ 0, this also implies
Ht+1 > 0. (22)
By (4) and (17), the beginning-of-period net worth of a representative household




(1 + χ(s)) , (23)
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and restrict Ht for technical reasons to the compact set
Ht ∈ [0, h̄Zt] ≡ H(Zt). (24)
2.7 Expectations
Households form expectations of (1/P )t before trade given the available infor-
mation. In the assumed Markovian environment, attention can be restricted to
expectations formed in a time-invariant way. Since households are competitive,
expectations cannot depend on individual state variables. Since Zt and et are the




η(Zt, et, ut, st), (25)
where η : R+ ×R+ × U × S → [0,∞) is a jointly continuous function, and et/Zt
is added without loss of generality. One can further restrict attention to func-
tions η that are bounded, since otherwise a household could expect to purchase
consumption exceeding the value of the whole economy.
Under expectations formed in this way, consumption (12) becomes
ct = et
{









The expectations of the evolution of Zt are represented by the model
Zt+1 = θ(Zt, et, ut, st), (27)
where θ : R+ ×R+ × U × S → R+ is a jointly continuous function. According to
observation 1, this function is independent of st+1.
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2.8 Technical Constraints
Additional constraints must be imposed for technical reasons to ensure that the
choice of households is well defined. These constraints must be compatible with
the idea of competitive equilibrium, where households never directly experience
aggregate supply conditions and believe to be able to trade freely at the margin
in all markets that are active.
The demand for bonds will be restricted to















bs(s), b̄ > max
s∈S
bs(s). (29)
By construction, the interval (20), defining the feasible range for the realized bond
demand is always strictly inside the interval (28).17
Another constraint in addition to (11) is needed to prevent households from rising
infeasible funds Yt at low values of (1/P )t.
18 To find the appropriate bound, one
can think in terms of Mt, since M = Y . From the budget constraint (6),
Mt ≤ Ht − BtQt,
and the right-hand side is maximized by setting Bt = −
¯
bZt and Qt = 1. Since the
beginning-of-period net worth of a representative household is Ht = Zt(1+χ(st)),
one can choose ȳ > 0 such that
ȳ > max
s∈S
(1 + χ(s) +
¯
b) , (30)
17It is always possible to find constants
¯
b, b̄, since bs(s) is bounded.
18As an example, a household might want to raise an infinite amount of money
at (1/P )t = 0.
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and require
Yt ≤ ȳZt. (31)
For future reference, (29) can be used to show that
ȳ > 1/τ(s). (32)
Constraints (11) and (31) can be combined into a single constraint under (25).
Since both bind at the same time when η(Zt, et, ut, st) = 1/ȳ,









η(z,e,u,s)z if η(z, e, u, s) ≥ 1/ȳ,
ȳz if η(z, e, u, s) < 1/ȳ.
(33)
The function ȳ is positive and jointly continuous.
2.9 Household’s Problem
The state variables that a household must take into account in the decision process
are Ht, Zt, et, ut, st, and take values in X ≡ {(h, z, e, u, s) : z ∈ R+, h ∈ H(z), e ∈
R+, u ∈ U , s ∈ S}. A household evaluates its well-being using a jointly continuous
value function v : X → R, which in equilibrium must be co-determined with the
expectations.
One can restrict attention to value functions that represent maximized utility (2).
Proposition 2 A value function consistent with (2) is ϕ-bounded.
Proof. Let γ 6= 1 (the log case is similar). Define vt, the homothetic version of the
utility functional, via (
∑
s≥0 β
s)v1−γt /(1− γ) ≡ Vt. For fixed et, let v̄t be attained
in a hypothetical economy without frictions, and
¯
vt = (1 − κ)v̄t in an economy
where the fraction κ of endowment is lost. Since vt in a monetary economy is
bounded between
¯
vt and v̄t, Vt is ϕ-bounded.
At the beginning of t, knowing Ht, Zt, et, ut, st, a household forms expectations
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according to the functions η, θ, and chooses Mt, Yt, Bt subject to (5), (11), (6),
(9), (28), (31). The objective is to maximize
u(ct) + βEt[v(Ht+1, Zt+1, et+1, ut+1, st+1)],
subject to the laws (3) and (8), and given (26).
3 Definition of Equilibrium
Informally, an equilibrium is a value function and a set of functions representing
expectations such that the value function represents maximized utility functional,
agents do not miss any opportunity to improve their well-being, markets clear,
and expectations cannot be improved.
Define the set C(h, z, e, u, s) ⊂ R3 as the set of triples m, y, b satisfying




h ≥ m+ bq(s), (36)
0 ≤ h−m+ y + b[1− q(s)], (37)
y ≤ ȳ(z, e, u, s), (38)
For each Ht, Zt, et, ut, st ∈ X , C(Ht, Zt, et, ut, st) is the set of feasible choices of
Mt, Yt, Bt. This set is non-empty, since it contains Mt = Yt = Bt = 0, and
compact. The mapping X → C is a continuous correspondence.
Definition 2 An equilibrium is:
(a) A jointly continuous and bounded function η : R+ ×R+ × U × S → [0,∞),
and a jointly continuous function θ : R+ ×R+ × U × S → (0,∞),
(b) A jointly continuous and ϕ-bounded function v : X → R,
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such that:
(i) Given the functions η, θ, the function v solves






v(h′, z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′)
}
, (39)
subject to: c = e
[








(m, y, b) ∈ C(h, z, e, u, s), (41)
h′ = h−m+ y + b(1− q(s)) + χ(s′)z′, (42)
z′ = θ(z, e, u, s), (43)
e′ = eλ(s, s′), (44)
(ii) For each z, e, u, s, the value v (z(1 + χ(s)), z, e, u, s) is attained by m, y, b that
satisfy m = y, b ∈ [{bs(s)z, 0}], w ≡ z(1 + χ(s))−m+ y + b(1− q(s)) > 0,
y < ȳz.
(iii) For each z, e, u, s, if there are functions ηp, θp specified as in (a), for which a
function vp specified as in (b) satisfies (i)-(ii), and if ηp(z, e, u, s) > 0, then
η(z, e, u, s) > 0.
Condition (i) restricts the set of equilibrium value functions to those that are con-
sistent with maximized utility functional (2). The first two sub-conditions of (ii)
guarantee that individually optimal choices are consistent with market clearing.
The third sub-condition of (ii) guarantees that the choices are consistent with
strict positivity of end-of-period net worth, as required by condition (21), and the
fourth sub-condition prevents the optimal demand for money from attaining the
technical upper bound of inequality (31). Condition (iii) postulates that if money
could be valuable without violating individual optimality and market clearing,
then it must be valuable in equilibrium.19
19Conditions analogous to (i)-(ii) are sufficient to define equilibrium in the fric-
tionless economy of Lucas (1978), where a condition analogous to (iii) would hold
trivially, since money would never be considered valuable.
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Any set of functions η, θ, v satisfying (a)-(b) and (i)-(ii) are referred to as pre-
equilibrium. Any equilibrium is a pre-equilibrium. If all pre-equilibria feature
η(z, e, u, s) = 0, then all of them are equilibria. If there is at least one pre-
equilibrium with ηp(z, e, u, s) > 0, then the set of equilibria must be restricted to
those pre-equilibria for which η(z, e, u, s) > 0.
By definition, expectations in a pre-equilibrium are always confirmed, which means
that households do not exercise their freedom to change their models η, θ. If
the awareness of other pre-equilibria can affect how the expectations are formed
then the concept of pre-equilibrium is too vague, and one needs an additional
equilibrium selection mechanism.
Such a mechanism is provided by condition (iii). To motivate it, consider a pre-
equilibrium with responsible monetary policy, but η = 0. After observing infor-
mation at t, households know that there exists a pre-equilibrium with ηp > 0
for all possible configurations of state variables, which can be interpreted as the
possibility that money will become valuable in the future. Given this knowledge,
rational households cannot be assumed to ignore the opportunity to acquire arbi-
trarily large quantities of money for free, in addition to their current holdings, and
it can be assumed that they enter the market for goods with such commitment.
By the same logic, no household should be willing to give away net worth for
free, so optimal decisions of sellers and buyers would disagree. One must conclude
that the existence of a pre-equilibrium with a strictly positive value of money,
guaranteed by a responsible design of monetary policy, is sufficient to rule out the
pre-equilibrium with worthless money.
Observation 2 Irrespective of monetary policy, there is a pre-equilibrium with
η(z, e, u, s) = 0, all z, e, u, s.
The existence of this pre-equilibrium is allowed by the possibility of self-fulfilling
expectations that money will always remain worthless.
The rest of this section is concerned with properties of equilibria that can be
18
deduced from conditions (i)-(ii). The proofs generalize those in Lucas (1978),
with necessary modifications to take into account the more complex environment
and endowment growth.
Proposition 3 For any functions η, θ specified as in (a), there is exactly one
non-negative, jointly continuous, and ϕ-bounded function v satisfying (i)-(ii).
Proof. Let V be the Banach space of jointly continuous, ϕ-bounded functions
g : X → R. Let T be an operator on V, defined such that condition (i) of definition
2 is equivalent to T v = v.
Applying T involves maximization of a jointly continuous function on a compact
set, by assumption 2, and by the definition of C. Hence, the maximum exists.
Since the set C is given by a continuous correspondence in the state variables, the
maximum is jointly continuous in h, z, e, u, s (Berge, 1963).
The function (T v)(h, z, e, u, s) is ϕ-bounded, since the maximand in (39) is a sum
of two ϕ-bounded functions. Indeed, this is true of u(c) under the assumed CRRA
utility, since
c ≤ (1− κ)e+ (1/P )m = e [(1− κ) + η(z, e, u, s)m/z]
≤ e [(1− κ) + η(z, e, u, s) (h/z − b/zq(s))] ≤ e
[




















































dF (s, s′) ≤ v̄β
∫
S
λ(s, s′)1−γdF (s, s′) < v̄,









< ∞, and the last inequality follows from assump-
tion 3. Hence, the operator T maps V into itself.
A similar argument can be used to show that for any a > 0 and f ∈ V, there
exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that T (f + aϕ) ≤ T f + δaϕ. (Set δ = w̄, defined under
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assumption 3.) In addition, (i) f ≥ g implies T f ≥ T g for any f, g ∈ V, and (ii)
T 0 ∈ V. Under these conditions, T has a unique fixed point v = T v in V, and
limn→∞ T
nf = v for every f ∈ V, by the weighted contraction mapping theorem
(Boud, 1990). Since v ≥ 0 implies T v ≥ 0, the fixed point is non-negative.
Proposition 4 In a pre-equilibrium, v(h, z, e, u, s) is non-decreasing in h, and
concave in h.
Proof. To show that v is non-decreasing, consider (T f)(h, z, e, u, s), for any
f ∈ V. The maximum is attained by some m, y, b ∈ C. An increase in h expands
the set C, so Tf is non-decreasing in h. This is true in particular for T v, and then
for v, since v = T v.
Take any concave function g(h, z, e, u, s) ∈ V. Fix z, e, u, s, let h0, h1 ∈ H(z) be
chosen, and let mi, yi, bi attain (T g)(hi, z, e, u, s), i ∈ {0, 1}. Define ci = e[(1 −
κ)+η(z, e, u, s)(mi/z− (1−κ)yi/z)], and h′i = hi−mi+yi+ bi(1−q(s))+χ(s′)z′,
i ∈ {0, 1}. For 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, define hθ ≡ θh0 + (1 − θ)h1, (mθ, yθ, bθ) ≡ (θm0 +
(1 − θ)m1, . . . , . . . ), cθ ≡ θc0 + (1 − θ)c1, and h′θ ≡ θh′0 + (1 − θ)h′1. Note that
mθ, yθ, bθ are feasible at hθ, h′θ = hθ −mθ + yθ + bθ(1− q(s)) + χ(s′)z′, and that
h′θ ∈ H(z). At hθ, T g satisfies





, z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′)
≥ θ(T g)(h0, z, e, u, s) + (1− θ)(T g)(h1, z, e, u, s).
Hence, (T g)(h, z, e, u, s) is concave in h for every g ∈ V. Since functions that
are concave in h form a Banach vector subspace of V, the fixed point v = T v is
concave in h.
The established concavity can be used to prove that:
Proposition 5 Under (i)-(ii), if the value function v is attained by m in the
interior of the feasible set at some h, z, e, u, s ∈ X for which η(z, e, u, s) > 0, then
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v is differentiable in h, and
∂
∂h
v(h, z, e, u, s) = u′(c)
e
z
η(z, e, u, s) (45)
Proof. Fix z, e, u, s, and let f : R+ → R+ be defined by f(A) ≡ (T v)(A, z, e, u, s).
Let m(A), y(A), and b(A) attain f(A).




[ηm+ (1− κ)(1− ηy]
)
. With η(z, e, u, s) > 0, ũ (m) is strictly
concave in m. By proposition 4 and (42), β
∫
S
v(h′, z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′) is concave
in m. Therefore, the maximand in the definition of (T v)(A, z, e, u, s) is strictly
concave in m, so m(A) is unique, and varies continuously with A (Berge, 1963).
Let h′(A) = A−m(A) + y(A) + b(A)(1− q(s)) + χ(s′)z′. For small ǫ, m(A) + ǫ is
feasible at A+ ǫ, and m(A+ ǫ)− ǫ is feasible at A. Using the definition of f ,
f(A+ ǫ) ≥ ũ(m(A+ ǫ)) + β
∫
S
g(h′(A), z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′),
= ũ(m(A+ ǫ))− ũ(m(A)) + f(A). (46)
f(A) ≥ ũ(m(A+ ǫ)− ǫ) + β
∫
S
g(h′(A+ ǫ), z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′),
= ũ(m(A+ ǫ)− ǫ)− ũ(m(A+ ǫ)) + f(A+ ǫ). (47)
Combining (46) and (47),
ũ(m(A+ ǫ))− ũ(m(A)) ≤ f(A+ ǫ)− f(A) ≤ ũ(m(A+ ǫ))− ũ(m(A+ ǫ)− ǫ).
Dividing by ǫ, taking the limit ǫ → 0, using the continuity of m(A) and the
definition of ũ(m), one finds that f ′(A) = u′(c) e
z
η(z, e, u, s). The partial derivative
of v(h, z, e, u, s) with respect to h is f ′(h), because v = T v, which proves (45).
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4 Constructing the Equilibrium
This section demonstrates by construction that under assumptions 8 and 9 there is
only one equilibrium. In that equilibrium, the value of money is strictly positive.
4.1 Differentiability of the Value Function
The strict positivity of η is first imposed as a hypothesis in addition to conditions
(i)-(ii) of definition 2. Under this combination of assumptions, the pre-equilibrium
value function of a representative household is differentiable in h, which is estab-
lished in the following three propositions.
Proposition 6 In a pre-equilibrium with η(z, e, u, s) > 0, it is true that m > 0
for all z, e, u, s.
Proof. A representative household holds h = (1 + χ(s))z = (h(s)/τ(s))z of
beginning-of-period net worth. By (42), h−m+ y + b[1− q(s)] strictly improves
the maximand of (39). Suppose m = 0, which also necessitates y = 0 by condition
(ii) of definition 2.
If q(s) < 1, a household would like to optimally set the demand for bonds b to the
maximal level allowed by the budget constraint (6) in order to benefit from the




z ≡ bd(s). This can only be consistent with
condition (ii) of pre-equilibrium if the supply for bonds bs(s) under the assumed
monetary policy is sufficiently large. However, as seen from (18), it is true that
bd(s) > bs(s).
If q(s) = 1, a household does not have strict preference between saving in bonds
or in money, since both result in the same value of end-of-period net worth (h).
Consider a strategy of increasing m and y by a small number ǫ > 0, which is
feasible since h > 0, and because ȳ(z, e, u, s) > 0, as seen from (38). This strat-
egy leaves the end-of-period net worth unchanged, but increases consumption by
κ e
z
η(z, e, u, s)ǫ > 0, as seen from (40), and hence increases utility. It follows that
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m = 0 cannot be optimal.
Proposition 7 In a pre-equilibrium, a representative household chooses m strictly
below the upper bound allowed by the set of feasible choices C(h, z, e, u, s).
Proof. Define a ≡ h−m− bq(s), and w ≡ h−m+ y+ b[1− q(s)], which are non-
negative by (36), and (37). Since w is defined as in requirement (ii) of definition
2, it must satisfy w > 0. Combining the two definitions, m = h + q(s)y − [1 −
q(s)]a− q(s)w. Since q(s) > 0, maximizing m would instead require setting w = 0
for any given values of y and a.
Proposition 8 In a pre-equilibrium with η(z, e, u, s) > 0, the value function v is
differentiable in h, at h = (1+χ(s))z, for all z, e, u, s.
Proof. By propositions (6) and (7), the value function v of a representative
household is attained by m in the interior of the feasible range allowed by budget
feasibility. For each z, e, u, s, since η(z, e, u, s) > 0, the conditions of proposition
(5) are satisfied at (1+χ(s))z, z, e, u, s, and hence the value function is differentiable
in h at h = (1+χ(s))z.








η(z, e, u, s) ≡ u′(c)(1/P ), (48)
where c is optimal consumption. In what follows, ν ′ will denote the partial deriva-
tive evaluated at state variables realized in the next period.
4.2 Pre-equilibrium with Positive Value of Money
The established differentiability of the value function can be used to explore the
implications of η(z, e, u, s) > 0 in a pre-equilibrium. The problem (39) can be
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studied using the Lagrangian




v ((h−m+ y + b[1− q(s)] + χ(s′)z′, z′, e′, u′, s′) dF (s, s′)
+ µ[h−m− bq(s)] + φ[ȳ(z, e, u, s)− y],
(49)





ν ′dF (s, s′)− µ = 0 (50)
h−m− bq(s) ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0, µ[h−m− bq(s)] = 0, (51)
The first-order conditions associated with optimal choice of y are
(1− κ)ν − β
∫
S
ν ′dF (s, s′) + φ = 0 (52)
ȳ − y ≥ 0, φ ≥ 0, φ(ȳ − y) = 0, (53)














dF (s, s′) = q(s), (55)
according to which a household invests in bonds such that the nominal marginal
rate of substitution equals the market discount factor.20
Using (55) in (54), one finds that µ/ν = 1 − q(s). Then, the complementary
20While this condition is standard, it only holds as consequence of assumptions
8 and 9. The same comment applies to other equilibrium conditions.
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slackness condition of (51) can be written as
[1− q(s)][h−m− bq(s)] = 0, (56)
so a household does not save ’under the bed’ at positive interest rate.
Dividing (52) by ν and using (55) gives φ/ν = κ+q(s)−1, which is positive under
assumption 9. Hence, the complementary slackness condition of (53) implies
y = ȳ(z, e, u, s). (57)
Intuitively, under a monetary policy that guarantees sufficiently low interest rates
in relation to the degree of inefficiency characterizing consumption of own endow-
ment, households always prefer to sell all endowment in the market.
To further investigate the implication of the condition above, recall that (38)
combines two constraints reflected in the definition of ȳ (33). If η < 1/ȳ, then
the demand for money would attain the technical upper bound y = ȳz, which is
impossible by the construction of that bound, and hence it must instead be true
that y = z/η(z, e, u, s), which is the same as y(1/P ) = e by the definition of (1/P ).
Since m = y holds in equilibrium,
m(1/P ) = e, (58)
which is a version of the equation of exchange (Fisher, 1911).
Using these results, one also finds that
ν = u′(e)(1/P ) = u′(e)
e
z
η(z, e, u, s). (59)
The pre-equilibrium price function η can be found by considering the dynamics of
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the end-of-period net worth of a representative household,21
Wt +Gt = Mt(1−Qt) +QtWt+1. (60)
Using (55) for the discount factor in front of Wt+1 and multiplying by (1/P )t,










where νt denotes the partial derivative (59) evaluated at realized state variables.
Also, it is true by (15) that
Wt(1/P )t = Wt
et
Zt
η(Zt, et, ut, st) = etη(Zt, et, ut, st).
Substituting this in (61) and applying (59) and (58) allows to interpret the former
as necessary condition for the price function η in the studied pre-equilibrium.
Restated in functional form,
η(z, e, u, s) = 1−q(s)−g(s)







η(z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′), (62)
where the laws of motion for z′ and e′ are given by (43) and (44), respectively.
Condition (62) can be compared with the definition of the function τ(s), com-
puted by the authority at the stage of policy implementation (re-stated here for
21This can be derived as follows:
Wt +Gt = Ht ≡ Mt +BtQt + (Ht −Mt −BtQt)
= Mt +BtQt + (Ht −Mt −BtQt)− (Ht −Mt −BtQt)(1−Qt)
= Mt(1−Qt) +Qt[Mt +Bt + (Ht −Mt −BtQt)]
= Mt(1−Qt) +Qt[Yt +Bt + (Ht −Mt −BtQt)]
= Mt(1−Qt) +QtWt+1.
The second line subtracts a term that is zero in equilibrium by the optimality
condition (56). The fourth line uses the Keynes law Mt = Yt, and the last line
applies (7), the definition of Wt+1.
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convenience),





τ(s′)dF (s, s′). (63)
Define a bounded and jointly continuous function x(z, e, u, s) ≡ η(z, e, u, s)−τ(s).
Subtracting (63) from (62) and solving for x(s) yields








x(z′, e′, u′, s′)dF (s, s′). (64)
Define operator Y such that (64) is equivalent to Yx = x. This operator maps
the space of bounded, jointly continuous functions in variables z, e, u, s onto itself.
Under assumptions 8 and 9 on monetary policy, it is true that g(s) ≥ 0 and
τ(s) > 0 (as shown in subsection 2.6), so the ratio in front of β is in (0, 1]. Under
the assumed CRRA utility, and assumption 3, this is enough to establish that Y
is a contraction mapping, and hence there is exactly one solution to (64). Since
x(z, e, u, s) = 0 is a solution, it must be the only solution. Hence, the unique price
function consistent with pre-equilibrium with η > 0 is
η(z, e, u, s) = τ(s), for all z, e, u, s. (65)
To complete the construction of the pre-equilibrium with η > 0, one must compute
the law of motion for the aggregate state variable Zt. Consider (58), written as




where h(s) ≡ τ(s) + g(s), as defined in subsection 2.6. Write the necessary condi-






and substitute into the law of motion (14). Using (66), and the definition of
τ(s), one finds that the unique model of the form (27) consistent with the actual













dF (s, s′) ≡ θ̃(s), (67)
and one can identify θ(z, e, u, s) = zθ̃(s). Under the assumed monetary policy, the
growth rate in Zt does not depend on state variables other than st.
With the unique set of functions η, θ consistent with pre-equilibrium with η > 0,
proposition 3 guarantees that there is exactly one corresponding value function v.
Hence, the constructed pre-equilibrium is unique.
4.3 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
The previous subsections show that under assumptions 8 and 9 there exists a
unique pre-equilibrium in which the value of money remains strictly positive. Ac-
cording to condition (iii) of definition 2, any equilibrium price function η must
then be strictly positive. Since every equilibrium is a pre-equilibrium, there can
be at most one equilibrium with η > 0. Since the pre-equilibrium of the previous
section satisfies condition (iii), it is an equilibrium, and hence the only equilibrium
is the one with the positive value of money.
One can also conclude that there exists exactly one equilibrium for every spec-
ification of monetary policy consistent with assumptions 8 and 9, in which the
fundamental value of money is determined by condition (65). Intuitively, the role
of a responsible monetary policy is to provide households with the knowledge that




5.1 Behavioral Aspect of Condition (iii)
This section shows that a non-zero value of money is supported in a pre-equilibrium
precisely when a representative household decides to assign strictly positive
marginal valuation to its beginning-of-period net worth. The definition of equilib-
rium imposes this decision automatically under a responsible monetary policy.
By equation (48), the value function v(h, z, e, u, s) in a pre-equilibrium is strictly
increasing in h at h = (1 + χ(s))z whenever η > 0. To prove the converse, let
η, θ, v be functions specified as in (a)-(b) of definition 2 satisfying conditions (i)-
(ii). Assume that the value function used by a representative household is strictly
increasing in h, i.e., that the households strictly prefers to hold more net worth,
rather than less, at the opening of the market for goods.
Hypothesis 1 The value function v(h, z, e, u, s) used by a representative house-
hold is strictly increasing in h at h = (1 + χ(s))z, for all z, e, u, s.
Proposition 9 Under Hypothesis 1, η(z, e, u, s) > 0, for all z, e, u, s, in a pre-
equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose η(z, e, u, s) = 0 for some z, e, u, s. Then, a household with value
function v that is strictly increasing in h finds it optimal to set y = ȳ(z, e, u, s) > 0
and m = 0 to maximize the right-hand side of (39). This true in particular at
h = (1 + χ(s))z, which results in a violation of condition (ii) of definition 2, so it
is necessary that η(z, e, u, s) > 0, for all z, e, u, s.
Hence, the assumption that money is valuable in a pre-equilibrium is equivalent
to the behavioral postulate of Hypothesis 1, so condition (iii) of definition 2 could
equivalently be formulated as: (iii) For each z, e, u, s, if there are functions ηp, θp
specified as in (a), for which a function vp specified as in (b) satisfies (i)-(ii), and
if ηp(z, e, u, s) > 0, then v(h, z, e, u, s) is strictly increasing in h at h = (1+χ(s))z.
This formulation would highlight the behavioral aspect of the proposed equilibrium
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selection mechanism, and the strict positivity of equilibrium value of money would
follow from proposition 9.
5.2 Ruling Out Speculative Price Dynamics
The economic intuition behind condition (64) can be developed as follows. Com-
paring the equilibrium value of money implied by (65) with equation (58), one
obtains τ(st) = Zt/Mt. Using this in (17) gives g(st) = Gt/Mt, and then
h(st) ≡ τ(st) + g(st) = Ht/Mt. Hence, the function h(s) reflects the inverse
marginal propensity to consume out of Ht, and the function x(z, e, u, s) can be
identified with deviation of Ht/Mt from h(st),


















The content of condition (64) is that this difference is dynamically unstable. At
given Ht, if a household decides to choose Mt according to a time-invariant rule
with Ht/Mt ≥ h(st), and Ht/Mt > h(st) with positive probability, then the ratio
Ht/Mt must eventually exceed any positive bound. By Mt(1/P )t = et, the real
value of Ht must then exceed any bound relative to et, violating individual ra-
tionality. Similarly, if a representative household decides to choose Mt according
to a time-invariant rule with Ht/Mt ≤ h(st), and Ht/Mt < h(st) with a positive
probability, then the ratio Ht/Mt must eventually turn negative, since x(Zt, et, st)
must exceed any negative bound. But this cannot happen without violating the
non-negativity of Ht, imposed on nominal net worth by the authority.
By assumption 9, equilibrium must be characterized by low interest rates to induce
households to sell all endowment in the market for goods such that Yt(1/P )t = et.
















Subtracting this from the previous condition,











so the market value of money differs from the fundamental value precisely when
the aggregate inverse marginal propensity to consume Ht/Mt differs from h(st).
Since this is never optimal, as discussed below equation (65), equilibrium value of
money never deviates from (1/P )∗t .
5.3 Some Equilibrium Arithmetic
Substituting (13) into the law of motion for beginning-of-period net worth (8),
Ht+1 −Ht = Bt(1−Qt) +Gt+1.
The net supply of risk-free bonds (19) is set in a way that households never
find it optimal to save ’under the bed’ even when Qt = 1 (which is allowed for
stochastically finite periods by assumption 8). Hence, the budget constraint (6) is
always satisfied with equality,
Ht = Mt +BtQt.
Substituting this into the previous equation and shifting the time index,
Bt−1 = Mt −Mt−1 −Gt +Btqt. (68)
Condition (68) can be used to study the properties of equilibrium in much the
same way in which one usually studies intertemporal budget constraints, and its
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economic content can be explained using discounted present values.22 For nota-
tional convenience, let











be the consumption-based present value of the fraction xt+s of aggregate endow-
ment starting from t+ r.23 Define πt+λt ≡ (Mt−Mt−1)/Mt as realized growth in
the volume of transactions. Dividing (68) by equilibrium price level Pt ≡ 1/(1/P )t
and solving forward for Bt−1/Pt in the usual way gives
Bt−1
Pt
= PVet,0 [(πt+s + λt+s)− gt+s] . (70)
According to this condition, the aggregate real demand for risk-free bonds offered
by the authority is positive (negative) precisely when the growth in the nominal
volume of transactions is expected to exceed (fall short of) the rate of new net
worth creation. This is intuitive, since holding nominal bonds forever cannot be
optimal, and households only hold them if they are planning to increase nominal
spending in the future faster than allowed by the rate of new transfers. Conversely,
if households are indebted, they must plan to use part of future transfers to repay
their debts.24
Another implication of equilibrium can be obtained starting from (68) in the form
Bt−1 +Mt−1 = (Bt +Mt)qt +Mt(1−Qt)−Gt.
22It is easy to confuse (68) with a budget constraint for the authority since one
cannot distinguish these concepts in the data. The authority is not restricted by
a budget constraint, but only by the design of monetary policy.
23For example, the process xt+s can be interpreted as time-varying tax rate, in
which case the functional returns the present value of real tax revenues.
24Condition (70) is formally similar to the central equation of the fiscal theory
of the price level (Sargent and Wallace, 1981; Woodford, 1995). This similarity is
superficial and only reflects the mathematics of present values. The same comment
applies to other present-value relations developed in this section.
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Dividing by the price level, solving forward, and rearranging the terms,
Bt−1 +Mt−1
Pt
+ PVet,0 [gt+s] = PV
e
t,0 [1− qt+s] . (71)
Since Ht = Mt−1 +Bt−1 +Gt, this is equivalent to
Ht
Pt
+ PVet,1 [gt+s] = PV
e
t,0 [1− qt+s] , (72)
where now gt is included in Ht/Pt. According to this condition, the real value of
the beginning-of-period nominal net worth held by the households, plus the real
present value of expected transfers, together add up to the real present value of
privately perceived losses associated with participation in the market for goods,
where selling endowment is effectively subject to a tax of 1−q = i
1+i
per unit
of endowment in present-value terms. The left-hand side can be interpreted as
monetary assets of households seen as buyers of endowment, which in equilibrium
must be balanced by monetary liabilities of the same households seen as sellers of
endowment.25
Condition (72) can also be written as
Ht
Pt
+ PVet,1 [gt+s] + PV
e
t,0 [qt+s] = PV
e
t,0 [1] , (73)
according to which the real value of the whole economy consists of three compo-
nents: (1) the real value of nominal net worth held by the households, (2) the real
present value of rationally expected transfers of new net worth, (3) the real present
value of expected receipts from the market for goods, postponed one period ahead
due to the lag in the payment system, and hence discounted by q. Only the first
component of wealth is liquid, but households never need to borrow against future
25This confirms that the usual accounting convention (used for historical rea-
sons) that money is a liability of the issuing authority makes little economic sense.
Money is not backed in any way by the authority but is endogenously accepted
by its users.
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nominal income and never experience borrowing constraints.26
One more implication of equilibrium can be obtained starting from the identity
Mt−1 = Mt(1−Qt)− (Mt −Mt−1) +QtMt.
Dividing by the price level and solving forward,
Mt−1
Pt
= PVet,0 [(1− qt+s)− (πt+s + λt+s)] . (74)
Since the left-hand side is positive, the nominal interest rate must in equilibrium
on average exceed the growth in the nominal volume of transactions.27
5.4 Literature Overview
The need to integrate the theory of money with the theory of value has been rec-
ognized by neoclassical economists (Walras, 1900; Hicks, 1935; Patinkin, 1965),
dissatisfied with the practice of using the ad-hoc equation of exchange (Fisher,
1911). However, a fully successful theory explaining how fiat money is valued has
never been offered. For example, Hahn (1965) observed that the classic study by
Patinkin (1965) could not not rule out the solution in which money was perma-
nently worthless and models with money-in-utility (or equivalent formulations) are
known to allow multiplicities of equilibria (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1983; Matsuyama,
1991), a property shared with overlapping-generations models (Samuelson, 1958)
and many other models starting from explicit frictions. In a detailed review of
26This condition reflects the property of the equilibrium that barter and other
forms of non-monetary exchange are never used.
27This condition should not be confused with the so-called Taylor principle pos-
tulated in new-Keynesian literature as necessary pre-condition for non-explosive
inflation (Taylor, 1993; Clarida et al., 2000; Woodford, 2003; Gaĺı, 2015). The
Taylor principle is supposed to apply to changes in the nominal interest rate in
response to changes in inflation in the activist Taylor (1993) rule, which is not
the type of monetary policy assumed here. Consistent with empirical evidence
by Cochrane (2018), the present model does not predict that inflation must ulti-
mately become unstable if the Taylor principle is violated although the nominal
rate could even be pegged at an arbitrary level.
34
monetary literature, Hellwig (1993) concluded that the fundamental problem of
why fiat money is valuable at all, especially in the presence of securities that
dominate it as a store of value (the Hahn problem) had not been solved, and his
analysis appears valid also today. The recent controversies around the fiscal theory
of the price level (Kocherlakota and Phelan, 1999; Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2000;
Buiter, 2002; Niepelt, 2004), and new-Keynesian models of inflation (Cochrane,
2011, 2018) can be seen as reflecting this unfortunate state of affairs.
This paper generalizes the asset-pricing framework of Lucas (1978) to a monetary
economy with explicit frictions. The decisions of competitive individuals to accept
money follow from their optimizing behavior, making the approach fundamentally
different from subsequent studies of Lucas (1980, 1982, 1984), relying on the cash-
in-advance (CIA) constraint (Clower, 1967; Grandmont and Younes, 1972). In
particular, it is shown that allowing the agents to be sufficiently sophisticated to
recognize arbitrage opportunities implied by the existence of money as a traded
object in the market for goods, together with a complete characterization of the
environment, are enough to establish the uniqueness of equilibrium and hence over-
turn the doctrine that equilibria of monetary models are inherently indeterminate,
or that equilibrium price level can be affected by self-fulfilling expectations.
The uniqueness of equilibrium proven in this paper does not offer justification for
selecting the unique bounded solutions for inflation in standard new-Keynesian
models (Woodford, 2003; Gaĺı, 2015). The usual argument for this relies on the so-
called Taylor principle (Taylor, 1993; Clarida et al., 2000), according to which the
monetary authority must commit to raising the interest rate sufficiently strongly
in response to inflation. This reasoning has been forcefully criticized by Cochrane
(2011, 2018) for lacking economic justification and empirical support, and the
present paper complements this critique by showing that the pre-conditions for
price stability are quite different from those postulated in that literature.28
28Moreover, aggregate nominal net worth plays no role in new-Keynesian mod-
els, while it defines the nominal scale of the economy in the present model, allowing
the authority to engineer essentially any path of inflation via a helicopter drop of
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This work can be seen as complementary to the fiscal theory of the price level
(FTPL), in which the authority, often called the government, issues fiat money
and interest-bearing debt as nominal liabilities (Sargent andWallace, 1981; Leeper,
1991; Sims, 1994; Woodford, 1995). The FTPL interprets qt, gt as defining seignior-
age and taxes, respectively, which are components of real government surplus.
Given a pre-determined measure of outstanding nominal liabilities, the price level
is defined as the unique conversion factor that makes their real value equal to the
discounted present value of the surpluses. The assumption that the government
is indeed able to issue valuable nominal liabilities and commit to a given path of
seigniorage and taxes has been known as non-Ricardian fiscal policy (Woodford,
1995) and has been subject to much controversy (Kocherlakota and Phelan, 1999;
Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2000; Buiter, 2002; Niepelt, 2004). The present study
can be seen as providing the implementation theory missing in the bare formula-
tion of the FTPL, confirming that the authority can indeed follow a non-Ricardian
policy. However, the equilibrium selection mechanism employed here is very dif-
ferent from that postulated by the FTPL. Moreover, the usual interpretation of
the FTPL appears invalid since a fiscal government is not even part of the model
and no taxes are raised by the authority. Incidentally, the interpretation assigned
to qt, gt by the FTPL reverses their economic meaning since the nominal interest
rate implied by the discount factor qt is, in fact, a tax on the receipts from the
market for goods, while gt is the flow of seigniorage, defined as real revenue of
those who are the first to receive transfers of new net worth.
It may appear as if the present paper justifies the practice of imposing the CIA
constraint in an ad-hoc way, interpreted as an equilibrium condition in the market
for goods. However, this is only valid under a responsible monetary policy, so im-
posing the CIA constraint with no regard to the policy may seriously misrepresent
individual incentives and has often been interpreted as an artificial restriction on
new net worth. The idea of a helicopter drop of money, originally due to Friedman
(1969), has recently been under renewed interest (Bernanke, 2002, 2003; Buiter,
2014; Benigno and Nisticò, 2020; Gaĺı, 2020).
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behavior. The model differs from Lucas and Stokey (1987), where the CIA con-
straint is imposed only on a subset of transactions while other transactions are
exempt from it. The authors interpret the latter as intermediated by credit, al-
though their model admits an alternative interpretation of barter. The present
paper does not disallow credit from the authority, but private credit is assumed
too costly to be used in equilibrium.
Much of modern thinking about money is rooted in the so-called portfolio tradi-
tion (Hicks, 1935; Keynes, 1930; Tobin, 1958; Friedman, 1956). It is interesting
to note that the equilibrium selection mechanism proposed here would not be op-
erational under this interpretation of money, which abstracts from the market for
goods and treats money as a purely speculative investment asset. By highlighting
this problem with the portfolio tradition, this paper contributes to the literature
rejecting it for lacking both internal consistency and economic intuition.29 Instead
of holding money, households in the present model optimally plan to spend it as
soon as possible, which appears consistent with the intuition (and anecdotal evi-
dence) that rational households treat money as a hot potato, or at least would do
so in the absence of transaction costs reducing the advantage of interest-bearing
securities over money. This is intuitive since money in the present model is not
backed by any stream of dividends, so holding it cannot be optimal.
The model starts from the list of properties characterizing actual economic envi-
ronments. Prominent examples of this approach include OLG models (Samuelson,
1958; Grandmont and Laroque, 1973; Wallace, 1980), turnpike models (Townsend,
1980), models of self-insurance against idiosyncratic risks (Bewley, 1977; Aiyagari,
1994), or models in which the technology of exchange is restricted to infrequent bi-
lateral meetings (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989; Trejos and Wright, 1995; Shi, 1995;
Lagos and Wright, 2005). Some of these theories rely on specific assumptions
which are quite restrictive or stylized and sometimes make it difficult to easily
interpret the results. While some admit analytical tractability, others do not. For
29See Kohn (1988) for a survey of the related literature.
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example, the approach based on bilateral meetings is plagued with analytical diffi-
culties arising from the need to keep track of random changes in the distribution of
money across agents, which can only be resolved by imposing additional technical
assumptions such as quasi-linear utility (Howitt, 2003). The role of restricting
the frequency of meetings in that literature is to place a limit on the velocity of
circulation, which in the present paper is achieved by introducing the payment
system with a pre-determined technological time lag. This allows maintaining
the assumption of a competitive market for goods in which agents can interact
without restrictions and to meaningfully define the competitive equilibrium value
of money. It should be noted that the model does not rely on the existence of
a Walrasian auctioneer since households can compute the unique market-clearing
price level already before trade based on their information.
This work connects with the older literature on the transactions demand for money,
as surveyed, for example, by Ostroy and Starr (1990). While the contribution of
that literature was to better understand the origins of frictions, it has not offered
the answer to why money could be expected to circulate at a unique equilibrium
value depending on the design of the monetary policy.
Since the focus is on fiat money, the paper fundamentally differs from studies where
the value of money is guaranteed by a form of real backing, perhaps implicit, and
usually impossible to detect in equilibrium.30
6 Concluding Remarks
While this paper does not offer a completely new theory of money, it re-formulates
the classical theory in the language of modern asset pricing, and shows that it can
be applied to a model economy closely corresponding to an actual economy relying
on an electronic payment system. Although the model is based on several idealized
30Examples include Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983); Del Negro and Sims (2015);
Hall and Reis (2016); Benigno (2020).
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assumptions, the author believes that it very accurately reflects the economic
function of money, and the incentives of its users. For this reason, it can serve as
a workhorse for studying topics related to money and monetary policy.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the analysis already. First, money is never
held as part of the optimal portfolio but circulates between trading parties like
the anecdotal hot potato, with velocity restricted by technological properties of
the payment system. Second, if the marginal cost of producing money is zero,
there is no economic justification in allowing the authority to distribute seignior-
age rents unequally across the society, which can only be seen as contributing to
economically unjustified wealth inequality. Third, since two responsible monetary
policies that differ in terms of bond supplies and transfers (and hence equilibrium
price processes) generally possess the same efficiency properties, the supply of
credit from the authority does not necessarily improve the efficiency of resource
allocation, but may simply be aimed at extracting seigniorage rents.31 Fourth,
the model predicts that barter and Arrow-Debreu forward markets for privately
negotiated contracts remain inactive under a responsible monetary policy since
monetary infrastructure provides the society with a less costly alternative. Since
all income in the resulting equilibrium is nominal, the model highlights the central
role of monetary policy in shaping individual expectations of lifetime income and
wealth. This suggests that wealth effects associated with changes in monetary pol-
icy can easily be of first-order importance as drivers of business activity, especially
if monetary policy is not designed correctly, or implemented non-transparently.32
31Even in a Pareto-efficient allocation, the marginal value of a new dollar is pos-
itive (equal to the inverse price level), so the incentives to reap private seigniorage
rents may be too strong to resist.
32The theory should not be misinterpreted as predicting that money or monetary
policy are neutral. This could only be true under the idealized conditions.
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Woodford, Michael (1995), “Price-level determinacy without control of a monetary
aggregate.” In Carnegie-Rochester conference series on public policy, volume 43,
1–46.
Woodford, Michael (2003), Interest and prices. Princeton University Press.
43
